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State and Local Government
by Daryl J. McKinstry*
Municipal Corporations

Legislative Authority

Does the publisher of a newspaper have a right under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution to place a newspaper on private premises without the
consent of the residents? Pacific Grove's city council did not
think so; the reason advanced was that a collection of newspapers on the property of an absent owner might tend to
attract persons with dissolute or criminal propensities. The
court in Di Lorenzo v. City ot Pacific Grovel expressed its
agreement by upholding the council's ordinance prohibiting
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such unsolicited newspaper deliveries. Although the court
conceded that the ordinance could not prohibit deliveries to
which an occupant consented, it held that the ordinance did
not violate any constitutional rights of the distributor, since
it was narrowly drawn to prevent a specific evil which the
council found to exist.
In another case dealing with newspapers, Long v. City of
Anaheim,2 the court decided that the newspaper Weekly People
was a non-commerical, non-profit, purely political publication
under the court's interpretation of the ordinances of Anaheim
and Garden Grove and that the publication thus came under
exemptions of non-profit organizations contained in the ordinance.
A city council has the duty of setting salaries of municipal
employees. While the legislative body must resolve the fundamental issues as to such matters, the court in Kugler v. Yocum 3
held that established legislation is not rendered invalid as
an unlawful delegation of power merely because some other
entity, private or governmental, performs a role in application
or implementation of the enactment. A proposed ordinance
of the City of Alhambra, in the form of an initiative measure,
provided that its firemen be entitled to receive as a minimum
salary the average salary among members of the fire departments of the City and County of Los Angeles. The court
found that this ordinance would not if enacted unlawfully
delegate the power to fix future minimum salaries for Alhambra's firemen to the legislative bodies of the City and County
of Los Angeles.
In People v. Mason/ the court held that, since sections
330.5 and 330(b) of the Penal Code exempt from state
regulation pinball machines that are predominantly games of
skill, a local ordinance making possession of a pinball machine
illegal is valid if the machine qualifies as a game of skill.
Whether or not a particular machine so qualifies is a factual
2. 255 Cal. App.2d 191,63 Cal. Rptr.
56 (1967).
3. 69 Cal.2d 371, 71 Cal. Rptr. 687,
445 P.2d 303 (1968).
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determination to be made in each case. 5 The appellant contended that because the state legislation exempts such machines
its intent was to make their possession legal, and that any
attempt by the City of Santa Fe Springs to regulate them violates the California Constitution. The court concluded that
the legislative scheme was not intended to encompass all types
of pinball machines and that machines not included are subject to local legislation.

Conflict of Interests
In Millbrae Association for Residential Survival v. City of
Millbrae,6 dealing primarily with procedural steps in rezoning
lands under provisions of the Government Code, 7 the court
was faced with an alleged conflict of interest prohibited by the
Code. s This section prohibits certain officers and employees
from being interested in contracts made in their official capacity. The court stressed the importance of broadly construing the word "made" to encompass such embodiments as
preliminary discussions, negotiations, compromises, reasoning,
planning, the drawing of plans and specifications, and the
solicitation of bids. The court stated that no evidence was
found that the city engineer, the employee in question, ever
participated officially in the making of any of the contracts
in dispute. Additionally, the court said it was unnecessary
to show fraud or dishonesty for invalidating contracts coming
within this section.
In Gonsalves v. City of Dairy Valley, 9 the city council
granted a special use permit to a dairymen's cooperative to
allow the stockpiling of fertilizer. Each of the five city
councilmen were stockholders in the cooperative. The court
pointed out that although an action by an administrative body
that is arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent is void and subject
to annulment, the fact that the councilmen owned stock in
5. See Knowles v. O'Connor, 266
Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr. 879
(1968).
6. 262 Cal. App.2d 222, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 251 (1968).

7.
8.
9.
255

Gov. Code §§ 65800-65805.
Gov. Code § 1090.
265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
(1968).
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the applicant cooperative did not render their action arbitrary,
capricious or fraudulent. It is well settled that where an administrative body has the duty to act upon a matter before it
and is the only entity capable to act upon it, the members' personal interest does not disqualify them from performing their
duty.lo [No discussion of section 1090 of the Government
Code arose since no argument was made that the special use
permit constituted a contract.]
Retirement and Pension

Cases concerning retirement and pensions of public employees often deal merely with statutory construction of provisions relating to such matters in charters or ordinances.
These cases are not considered important. The general rule
is that pension provisions must be liberally construed in favor
of the persons benefited by them.
The court in Pathe v. City of Bakersfieldll decided that
a city is authorized to retire an employee found to be physically
or mentally incapacitated for the performance of duty, notwithstanding an Industrial Accident Commission finding that
the employees suffered from no service-connected disability.
It is well settled that where a city charter provision relating to
retirement compensation conflicts with the compensation sections of the Labor Code, the Code sections must prevail. In
Pathe, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Commission
overlapped the subject matter jurisdiction of the city pension
board on the single issue of whether or not an injury or disability was service connected. But the court held that the
pension board did not lose its inherent power to retire a city
employee found to be incapacitated for the performance of his
duty simply because the Industrial Accident Commission determined that the injury was not service connected. The
rationale of the decision was that a charter provision allowing
the city to retire an employee so incapacitated and a determination of whether or not the disability is service connected
do not invade the province of the Workmen's Compensation
10. See Barnett v. Brizee, 258 Cal.
App.2d 97, 65 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1968).
168
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Law; the charter provIsIon may merely add compensation
benefits to employees who are compelled to retire for service
connected disabilities.
The assignability of retirement funds was considered in
City of San Jose v. Forsythe. 12 A section of the municipal
code stated that money in an employee's retirement fund was
unassignable. An employee had given a power of attorney to
the county credit union in order to borrow money from the
union. After the borrower had left city employment, the credit
union demanded the accumulated contributions in his retirement fund. The court held that the credit union was not
entitled to the money in the fund I3 because California lawI4
favors the enforcement of regulations protecting retirement
benefits from the claims of creditors.
Counties

County Service Areas

The question presented in Byers v. Board of Supervisors I5
was whether the maintenance and operation of a television
translator station was authorized under the provisions of the
County Service Area Law found in sections 25210.1 et seq.
of the Government Code. Since the operation and maintenance of a television translator station is not expr~S$ly
provided for in the County Service Area Law, the court had to
decide whether or not such a function would qualify as an
"extended service" that the county would be authorized by law
to perform. IS The county argued that establishment of the
county service area was a legislative act, not to be disturbed
by the court. The court cited Marbury v. Madison/ 7 in which
12. 261 Cal. App.2d 114, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 754 (1968).
13. Compare McDaniel v. City &
County of San Francisco, 259 Cal. App.
2d 356, 66 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1968), where
it was held that funds in a retirement
system claimed by an employee after
suspension could be attached and paid
into court.
14. See Thomas v. Thomas, 192 Cal.
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App.2d 771, 13 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1961).
See also Lande v. lurisich, 59 Cal. App.
2d 613. 139 P.2d 657 (1943).
15. 262 Cal. App.2d 148. 68 Cal.
Rptr. 549 (1968). For a further discllssion of this case. see Friedenthal.
CIVIL PROCEDURE.

16. See Gov. Code § 25210.4(d).
17. 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137. 2 L.Ed.
60 (1803).
CAL LAW 1969
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Mr. Justice Marshall contended that a legislature's act is void
if it is beyond the legislature's power and that the judiciary is
bound to uphold the limited grant of power by disregarding
the legislative act. Finding no law authorizing the county to
provide television translator service, the court in Byers said
that if the board of supervisors is to be granted power to create
districts for television translator stations, the state legislature
should make this grant in specific terms.
Secret Meeting Law
Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Board
of Supervisors 18 contains a comprehensive analysis of the
provisions of the Brown Act, found in sections 54950 et seq.
of the Government Code. The decision is particularly important to attorneys representing public agencies because the
court discussed the possible conflict of the provisions of the
Brown Act with the attorney-client privilege under the Evidence Code.
The controversy in Sacramento Newspaper Guild centered
upon a preliminary injunction restraining the Sacramento
County Board of Supervisors and its committees from holding
any closed meetings at which three or more members were
present (provided the statutory exceptions for personnel and
national security matters as set forth in the Government Code
did not apply). Provoking the injunction was a luncheon
meeting of five supervisors, the county counsel, the county ,
executive, the county director of welfare, and several union
members. The subject of discussion was a strike by the social
workers union against the county and the effort by the county
to enforce an injunction pertaining to the strike. Newspaper
reporters were denied admission.
The decision settled an important question-does the Brown
Act apply only to formal meetings of a public body held for
the transaction of official business or does it also apply to informal meetings? In Adler v. City Council of Culver City,19
it was held that the Brown Act did not apply to informal
18. 263 Cal. App.2d 41, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1968).
170
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meetings. Although the Attorney General had issued an opinion 20 stating that the 1961 amendments to the Brown Act
nullified the Adler decision, the court in Sacramento Newspaper Guild resolved any doubt by expressly overruling Adler.
It pointed out that section 54950 declares that deliberation as
well as action must occur openly and publicly and that deliberation connotes not only collective discussion, but also the
collective acquisition and exchange of facts preliminary to
the ultimate decision. Thus, the term "meeting" construed
in light of the Brown Act's objectives extends to informal discussions and conferences of board members designed for the
discussion of business. Concluding that the luncheon meeting in this case was such a meeting, the court upheld the
injunction.
Significantly, the court stated that the attorney-client privilege l was not abrogated by the Brown Act. To reach this
conclusion the court had to reconcile provisions of the Brown
Act demanding open meetings and those of the Evidence Code
assuring confidential lawyer-client communications. The
court recognized that these statutes manifest separate policies
and, also, that neither expressly refers to the other as controlling. Nevertheless, the court had to answer the question
whether the language of the Brown Act impliedly superseded
the attorney-client privilege, since the Act was passed subsequent to the statutory recognition of the privilege. In
resolving this issue, the court pointed out that the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege is as meaningful and as
financially important to public clients as it is to private ones.
The court concluded that the Act did not abolish the opportunity of boards of supervisors to confer privately with their
attorneys on occasions properly requiring confidentiality, but
it warned that the privilege should not be expanded beyond
its proper scope to avoid public meetings. In keeping with
its conclusion, the appellate court modified the trial court's
injunction to allow closed meetings when the attorney-client
privilege obtains.
20. 32 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 240, 242.

1. See Cal. Evid. Code

§

952.

CAL LAW 1969
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Grand Jury

In Board of Trustees of Calaveras School District v. Leach,2
the question before the court was whether or not a grand jury
is entitled to inspect the personnel records of a school district
pursuant to an inquiry other than the willful or corrupt misconduct of any public officer. The grand jury relied upon
section 933.5 of the Penal Code which provides, "[AJ grand
jury may at any time examine the books and records of any
special purpose assessment or taxing district located wholly
ot partly in the county". The court held that the grand jury
~s· not entitled to examine the school district's personnel
tecotds because section 933.5 limits the grand jury's investigatfqn to only the financial affairs of a district when it investigatefmatters other than public offenses or misconduct.
Legislative Authority

In Cooper v. Michael,a the court examined a county ordinance requiring auctioneers to obtain a business license. After
noting that section 16100 of the Business and Professions
Code authorizes a board of supervisors to license any kind
of lawful business only for the purpose of regulating it, the
court held that the ordinance's purpose was to raise revenue,
not to regulate conduct, and that the ordinance therefore
violated section 16100. (This statutory prohibition does not
extend to cities.)
Care of Prisoners

Where an arrest is made by a city police officer of a person
charged with murder and the accused requires medical attention, who has the obligation to pay for the medical treatment?
This was the question in Washington Township Hospital
District v. County of Alameda. 4 The person arrested was
taken by a police officer to plaintiff hospital for medical treat2. 258 Cal. App.2d 281, 65 Cal. Rptr.
588 (1968).
3. 257 Cal. App.2d 176, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1967).
172
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ment and was later transferred to Alameda County Hospital.
Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief on the ground
that the county was liable for the cost of the accused's medical
treatment. In construing section 29602 of the Government
Code,S the court held that the county was liable for its emergency treatment of the prisoner since this treatment constituted
"other services," in relation to criminal proceedings brought
by the county, for which no compensation was prescribed
by law.

Employee Relations
Schools and School Districts

In Board of Trustees v. Porini,6 the court held that when
suspension and notice of intention to dismiss are based upon
incompetency due to a mental disability, the school district
must prove that the teacher is incompetent at the time of trial.
Although the court found that there was substantial evidence
showing that the teacher was mentally disabled at the time
she was suspended, the evidence was insufficient to show that
the teacher was incompetent at the time of trial. Appellant
had last consulted with respondent's psychiatrist 13 months
before trial, and for this reason the respondent could not
offer evidence of any change in the appellant's mental condition. However, the appellant had been seeing her own psychiatrist for some months prior to the time of trial, and
was able to introduce evidence of her continued improvement
based on current observations.
The court stated that the school district must show either
that the disability was permanent or that it had lasted over
two years. The lesser showing is permitted by Education Code
5. § 29602. Expenses of support of
persons committed to county jail, rehabilitative programs, and other services relating to criminal proceedings.
The expenses necessarily incurred in
the support of persons charged with or
convicted of crime and committed to
the county jail and the maintenance
therein and in other county adult de-

tension facilities of a program of rehabilitative services in the fields of
training, employment, recreation, and
prerelease activities, and for other services in relation to criminal proceedings
for which no specific compensation is
prescribed by law are county charges.
6. 263 Cal. App.2d 784, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
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section 13437,7 which allows a two-year leave of absence in
lieu of dismissal. In addition, the court noted that where
the judgment grants a leave of absence, the school board has
the burden of proving continued incompetency at the end of
the two-year period in order to obtain the dismissal of a
teacher. Finally, the court held that the statutory prohibitions against giving a teacher a notice of dismissal between
May 15 and September 15 8 does not apply where the law
authorizes suspension of a teacher as a prelude to dismissal.
In Hutton v. Pasadena City Schools,9 a school custodian
was suspended without pay after being charged with child
molesting. He was dismissed after his conviction, but the
conviction was reversed and he was found not guilty at a
new trial. The superintendent of the school district sent the
custodian a letter expressing a willingness to pay him for the
period of this suspension if the district was authorized to do
so. To determine the district's authorization, the custodian
brought an action for declaratory relief. The court conceded
that the district had the authority, in adopting its rules and
regulations concerning benefits of classified personnel, to allow
such a payment; but since there was no such rule in force
when the employee was suspended, the school district could
not now adopt a rule applying retroactively to him. To do
so, the court said, would be making a gift of public money,
contrary to the California Constitution. 10
Cities and Counties
The legislature amended sections 3500 et seq. of the Government Code, effective January 1, 1969. It is anticipated
7. § 13437. Leave of absence due to
incompetency.
If the cause is incompetency due to
physical or mental disability, in lieu of
dismissal the judgment may require the
employee to take a leave of absence for
only such period as may be necessary
for rehabilitation from the incompetency. The leave of absence shall not
exceed two years. During the leave of
absence, the employee shall be entitled
174
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to the benefits authorized by this code
to employees of school districts absent
from their duties on account of sickness.
8. See Cal. Ed. Code § 13405; See
also §§ 13408, 13410.
9. 261 Cal. App.2d 586, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 103 (1968).

10. See California Constitution, Article XIII, Section 25.
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that the amendments will have a significant impact upon relationships between public employees and public agencies.
Basically, these changes require public agencies to confer in
good faith with representatives of recognized employee
organizations and to fully disclose to employees matters
respecting wages, hours, and other terms of employment.

Planning and Zoning
Billboards and Outdoor Advertising

Billboards and esthetics as well as the Outdoor Advertising
Actl l were considered in Desert Outdoor Advertising v. County
of San Bernardino. 12 The court cited County of Santa Barbara
v. Purcell, Inc./ 3 holding that the presence of billboards along
a highway could reasonably be believed to have an adverse
effect on the economy of a county. Therefore, billboards may
be controlled by ordinance, notwithstanding the fact that
control of billboards is based, in part, upon esthetic considerations. In Desert Outdoor Advertising, there was evidence
that the lack of billboards along freeways not only kept the
county beautiful but also attracted tourists and industries to
the country, thus conferring economic benefit. According to
the court, the evidence was sufficient to put the case within
the rule of County of Santa Barbara v. Purcell. The court
also held that the Outdoor Advertising Act has not preempted
the field as to all aspects of outdoor advertising in unincorporated county areas: counties still have the power to regulate
billboards and outdoor advertising by zoning ordinances. 14
In West Coast Advertising Company v. City & County of
San Francisco/ 5 petitioner sought approval from the city zoning administrator to erect a billboard on his property, which
was adjacent to a freeway. The application for a permit was
denied and the petitioner appealed to the Board of Permit
11. Cal. Bus. &
5200 et seq.
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13. 251 Cal. App.2d 169, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1967).

12. 255 Cal. App.2d 765, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 543 (1967), app. dismd. 393 U.S.
8, 21 L.Ed.2d 10, 89 S.Ct. 45.

14. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
5227.
15. 256 Cal. App.2d 357, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1967).
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Appeals, which overruled the zoning administrator. When
the latter refused to comply with the board's order, the petitioner filed an application for a writ of mandate.
At the hearing on the application, all parties knew the city
was considering an ordinance that would prohibit billboards
on property adjacent to freeways. The lower court granted
the writ of mandate. However, on the following day the
proposed new ordinance was signed. Petitioner contended
that the writ was properly issued since the new ordinance did
not become effective until thirty days after the court below
entered its order and that he therefore had a vested right
in the building permit.
In ruling against the petitioner, the appellate court pointed
out that even a permit which has received administrative
finality can be revoked on the basis of a subsequent change
in the zoning laws and that the permittee is immune from
such retroactive application only if he constructs a substantial
portion of the structure, as authorized by the permit, in good
faith reliance upon prior law. In this case, there was no
evidence that any substantial construction had been commenced; in fact, the permit had not even been issued.
Variances and Conditional Use Permits

In Tush v. Board of Supervisors/ 6 the court affirmed the
well settled rule that where specific findings are necessary to
support the grant of a conditional use permit or variance, the
findings must be recited in the ultimate decision of the governing body.
In Moss v. Board of Zoning Adjustment,l7 respondents
owned a three-acre parcel that was zoned for residential
purposes in San Fernando Valley. Respondents filed an application for a zoning variance with the zoning administrator
to permit construction of a motel complex, including restaurant, coffee shop, cocktail lounge, and automobile service
station. The zoning administrator denied respondent's application for a variance.
16. 262 Cal. App.2d 279, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 505 (1968).
176
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The city charter authorized the zoning administrator to
grant a variance, provided that he make 4 enumerated findings
in writing. 1s Additionally, the charter empowered a board
of zoning adjustment to hear and determine appeals from
rulings of the zoning administrator, subject to the same requirements with respect to findings. In considering an appeal
from a ruling of the administrator, the board requested its
secretary to prepare findings, which were to be presented at
a future board meeting for granting the appeal and to set
forth the conditions as shown in the record. The secretary
prepared the necessary findings for granting the appeal, but
the findings were never adopted by the board. At a later
meeting, additional testimony was taken on the appeal; after
a motion was made and seconded to grant the appeal, it failed
to pass.
The lower court issued a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the board to execute, file, and distribute its findings
as prepared by the secretary. The appellate court reversed,
pointing out that even assuming the board intended to grant
the variance, mandate was not the proper remedy, for the
board failed to comply with the statutory requirements-the
formalization of the findings required for grant of a variance.
Again, the court asserted that where findings are required
before the issuance of a conditional use permit or variance,
they must be made.
In Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Manufacturing Company v.
County of San Joaquin,19 a use permit was conditioned upon
the applicant conveying certain property to the county for
18. Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 274, § 98,
pp. 4676-4677. The findings are (a)
that the strict application of the zoning
regulations or requirements would result
in practical difficulties or unnecessary
hardships inconsistent with the general
purposes and intent of the regulations,
(b) that there are exceptional circumstances or conditions applicable to the
property involved or to the intended use
or development of the property that do
not generally apply to other property
12
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in the same zone or neighborhood, (c)
that the granting of a variance will not
be materially detrimental to the public
welfare or injurious to property or improvements in such zone or neighborhood in which the property is located.
(d) that the granting of a variance will
not be contrary to the objectives of
the Master Plan.
19. 257 Cal. App.2d 181, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 37 (1967).
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construction of a road. The basis for the condition was that
if the use permit was granted, it would substantially increase
the vehicular traffic and thereby necessitate a road. At the
trial no testimony was taken: the trial judge relied solely on
the evidence introduced before the planning commission. The
judge determined that traffic would be increased and therefore
concluded that the condition was valid. The appellate court,
in reviewing the record, found no evidence that there would
be any appreciable increase in traffic and held that the condition was arbitrary and not a legitimate exercise of police
power. Citing Gong v. City of Fremont,20 the court recognized that conditions may be imposed on the grant of a use
permit, and that the courts have no authority to interfere with
the denial of a variance or use permit except on a clear, convincing showing of fraud, illegality, or abuse of discretion.
Nevertheless, it thought the lower court had abused its discretion. The appellate court's ruling is interesting in that
it reversed the judgment with directions to the trial court to
issue a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the defendant
county to issue the use permit without the invalid conditions
rather than directing the trial court to take evidence on the
question of increased traffic flow and the necessity of constructing a road. In effect, the appellate court ruled on the
factual issue of whether the permit would result in an increase
in traffic and concluded that it would not and that nothing
could be developed in an evidentiary hearing that would show
otherwise.
Schools

Student Conduct

Although a male teacher has the constitutional right to wear
a beard/ the court in Akin v. Riverside Unified School District
Board of Education 2 held that this right does not extend to
20. 250 Cal. App.2d 568, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 664 (1967). Discussed in Cal.
Law-Trends and Del'elopments (1967)
at p. 445.
1. See Finot v. Pasadena City Board
178
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male high school students. The court cited the criteria established in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District,3
as necessary to allow a governmental agency to impose restrictions on the exercise of an individual's constitutional rights.
As stated in Bagley, the governmental agency must show the
following: (1) the government's restraint rationally relates
to the enhancement of the public service; (2) the benefits
the public gains by the restraint outweigh the resulting impairment of the constitutional right; (3) no alternative less subversive of the constitutional right is available. After reviewing
the testimony introduced at the trial, the court held that
in applying the Bagley formula, an "alternative less subversive" of the petitioner's right to grow a beard did not appear
to be available. The evidence upon which the court relied
tended to show that the wearing of mustaches, by male students had a disruptive influence in the educational process. In
addition, the improved educational atmosphere created by an
absence of beards was thought to outweigh by far the restraint
on the "peripheral right" to grow a beard. Confronted with
this evidence, the court concluded the school board had no
other course available.
Liability of Public Entities or Agencies
Filing of Claims

In Fonseca v. City of Santa Clara,4 plaintiff argued that a
minor's cause of action arising in 1950, not recognized at
that time because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity existing prior to the decision of Muskopf v. Corning Hospital
District,5 could not fall within the provisions of the claim statutes then in effect. Plaintiff filed her complaint in September,
1964, for an injury that occurred in July, 1950, when she was
a minor. In July, 1964, a claim was filed with the County
of Santa Clara. It was denied in August. The county relied
3. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401,
421 P.2d 409 (1966). Discussed in Cal.
Law-Trends
and
Developments
(1967) at pp. 338-342, 438.
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4. 263 Cal. App.2d 257, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 357 (1968).
5. 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
359 P.2d 457 (1961) modified on other
grounds 57 C.2d 488.
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on the provisions of sections 29700 et seq. of the Government Code, as those sections existed in 1950, to support the
contention that a claim had to be filed. The court held that
the action was barred because no claim was filed pursuant to
provisions of the Code as they existed in 1950 and because
there was nothing in subsequent legislation or in court decisions that would relieve the plaintiff from failure to file such
a claim. The court noted that even a minor must present a
claim within the period provided by law as a condition precedent to the accrual of a cause of action, citing Williams v.
Los Angeles Transit Authority.6
A government entity's notice or knowledge of an accident
does not excuse the failure of the claimant to file a timely claim
as required by statute. Still, a claimant might assert estoppel
as an excuse. In this connection, the court, in Petersen v.
City of Vallejo,7 held that in order to claim estoppel as an
excuse for the failure to file a claim, there must be some
affirmative representation or act by the public agency inducing
reliance by the claimant.
Filing of Complaints

Section 945.6 of the Government Code provides that any
suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for
which a claim must be presented should be commenced within
6 months after the date the claim was acted upon or was
deemed to have been rejected by the public entity. Although
the parties in Isaacson v. City of Oakland8 negotiated for a
settlement, no compromise settlement was made. The trial
court thought that the city had compromised the claim pursuant to the provisions of section 912.6 (a)(4).9 It reasoned
that since negotiation is necessary to compromise, the city,
by negotiating, was compromising the claim pursuant to sec6. 68 Cal.2d 599, 68 Cal. Rptr. 297,
440 P.2d 497 (1968).
7. 259 Cal. App. 2d 757, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 776 (1968).
8. 263 Cal. App.2d 414, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1968).
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9. § 912.6(a)(4), providing that if
legal liability of the public entity or
the amount justly due is disputed, the
board may reject or compromise the
claim.
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tion 912.6. The court concluded that the claim must be
deemed rejected when the negotiations ended and that the
filing of the complaint was therefore timely. The court found,
however, that section 912.6 cannot properly be construed as
equating negotiation with compromise and in the absence of
a written agreement extending the time to act on a claim,
the statute of limitations commences to run not later than
45 days after the filing of the claim.
In Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority,lO the plaintiff, a minor, filed a timely claim with the defendant, who rejected it. He filed complaint over six months
after the rejection. Section 945.6 of the Government Code,
as it then read, required that suit be commenced within
6 months after a claim was rejected or deemed rejected by
inaction of the governing board. The supreme court held
that section 352 of the Code of Civil Procedurell preserves
causes of actions of minors against the running of the statute
of limitations and that nothing in section 945.6 abrogates
that section or the public policy underlying it. The court
concluded that a minor is required to file a claim with the
public agency within the specified time requirements, but is
not required to file suit within the limitation period provided
by section 945.6.
When a complaint against a public employee is filed in a
federal court sitting in the State of California, the complaint
must allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. 12
The court in Williams v. Townsend/ 3 asserted it to be a well
established rule that where Congress failed to provide a
period of limitations within which an action must be brought
10. 68 Cal.2d 599, 68 Cal. Rptr. 297,
440 P.2d 497 (1968).
11. § 352. Exception, as to persons
under disabilities.
If a person entitled to bring an action,
mentioned in chapter three of this title,
be, at the time the cause of action accrued, either:
1: Under the age of majority; or,
2. Insane; or,
3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge,

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

or in execution under the sentence of a
criminal court for a term less than for
life; or,
4. A married woman, and her husband be a necessary party with her in
commencing such action;
the time of such disability is not a
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
12. Gov. Code § 950.2.
13. 283 F.Supp. 580 (D.C. [1968]).
CAL LAW 1969
181

17

State and Local Government

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 9

under the Federal Civil Rights Act,14 the statute of limitations
of the state where the cause of action arose is applied.
Estoppel

In Denham v. County of Los Angeles/ 5 a claim was filed
with the board of supervisors on November 16, 1964. The
board argued that the claim should have been "deemed re~
jected" on December 31, 1964 (45 days after the claim was
filed) by virtue of section 912.4 of the Government Code. l6
However, the board, on January 12, 1965, denied the claim
and advised the defendant of this action by letter. The
plaintiff thereupon filed his complaint. The county contended
that the plaintiff was 9 days too late and the trial court agreed
with this contention. The appellate court, in reversing the
judgment and order of dismissal, pointed out that the board
of supervisors, in reconsidering the claim on January 12, 1965,
manifested an intent to waive its right to stand on a rejection
by operation of law and an intent to rely on its later affirmative order of rejection. The court pointed out that the
county embarked upon a course of conduct entirely inconsistent with treating the claim as rejected by inaction and
thereby brought into play elements necessary to create an
14. 18 V.S.C.A. §§ 837, 1509, 20
V.S.C.A. §§ 241, 640, 42 V.S.C.A. §§
1971, 1974-1974e, 1975d.
15. 259 Cal. App.2d 860, 66 Cal.
R ptr. 922 (1968).
16. § 912.4 Board's action on claim:
Time.
(a) The board shall act on a claim
in the manner provided in section 912.6
or 912.8 within 45 days after the claim
has been presented. If a claim is
amended, the board shall act on the
amended claim within 45 days after the
amended claim is presented.
(b) The claimant and the board may
extend the period within which the
board is required to act on the claim
by written agreement made:
(I) Before the expiration of such
period; or
182
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(2) After the expiration of such period if an action based on the claim has
not been commenced and is not yet
barred by the period of limitations provided in section 945.6.
(c) If the board fails or refuses to
act on a claim within the time prescribed by this section, the claim shall
be deemed to have been rejected by the
board on the last day of the period
within which the board was required
to act upon the claim. If the period
within which the board is required to
act is extended by agreement pursuant
to this section, whether made before
or after the expiration of such period,
the last day of the period within which
the board is required to act shall be
the last day of the period specified in
such agreement.
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equitable estoppel. Citing Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles,17
the court set forth the four elements necessary for applying
the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped
must be apprised of the facts, (2) he must intend that his
conduct shall be acted upon or so act that the party asserting
the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended, (3) the
other party must be ignorant of the true facts, and (4) he
must rely upon the conduct to his injury. The court in
Denham found that these four elements were proven by the
plaintiff.
Liability for Dangerous Condition of Public Property

Unless a public agency has the legal authority to remedy
a dangerous condition, it cannot be held liable for injuries
caused by the condition. In Avey v. County of Santa Clara/ 8
plaintiffs argued that the county should have installed a barricade to prevent children crossing from a bus stop to a store
on the opposite side of 2 highways. The highways were
separated by an island; one was owned by the state and the
other by the defendant county. Plaintiffs contended that the
dangerous condition was not limited to state property. The
court held against the plaintiffs because they did not point
out the type of barricade that was necessary and that would
not interfere with the public right to enter the store, park
vehicles, and use the adjacent curbs and sidewalk. The court
concluded that section 835 of the Government Code19 did
not require the barricade.
17. 67 Cal.2d 297, 61 Cal. Rptr. 661,
431 P.2d 245 (1967).
18. 257 Cal. App.2d 708, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 181 (1968).
19. § 835. When public entity liable
for injury caused by dangerous condition of property: Requisite showing by
plaintiff:
Employee's negligent or
wrongful act: Actual or constructive
notice.
Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by
a dangerous condition of its property if
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the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the
time of the injury, that the injury was
proximately caused by the dangerous
condition, that the dangerous condition
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of
the kind of injury which was incurred,
and that either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or
omission of an employee of the public
entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition;
or
(b) The public entity had actual or
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Another contention by the plaintiffs was that the defendants
should have sought the state's consent to remove or shorten
obscuring foliage on the island. The court answered this
contention by saying that defendant's failure to ask the state
for permission was not a breach of duty because it was under
no duty to correct the condition.
In Holmes v. City of Oakland,20 the court reversed a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer was sustained without leave
to amend. The court held that a cause of action was stated
where it was alleged that an unguarded railroad operation on
a city street near a grammar school created a substantial risk
of injury to children using the street. The court determined
that the railroad crossing was under the control of the city,
thereby distinguishing the A vey case.
The court in Drummond v. City of Redondo Beach/ held
that a defect in a public street located off the usually traveled
portions of a highway is not a condition that may be considered "dangerous" under the definition of that term found in
section 830(a) of the Government Code. 2
Discretionary Immunity

During the investigation of an automobile accident, a
police officer employed by the City of Los Angeles and, at
the officer's request the plaintiff, were in the middle of an
intersection looking for skidmarks and other physical evidence
when they were struck by an automobile. The city, in McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles,3 appealed from an adverse
judgment. It contended that the police officer was perform-
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constructive notice of the dangerous
condition under section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have
taken measures to protect against the
dangerous condition.
20. 260 Cal. App.2d 378, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 197 (1968).
1. 255 Cal. App.2d 715, 63 Cal. Rptr.
497 (1967).
condition":
2. § 830. "Dangerous
"Protect against": "Property of a public entity" and "public property."
184
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As used in this chapter:
(a)"Dangerous condition" means a
condition of property that creates a
substantial (as distinguished from a
minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of
injury when such property or adjacent
property is used with due care in a
manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.
3. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 1 Cal. Rptr.
331 (1968).
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ing a discretionary act, namely, the investigation of an automobile accident, and argued that section 820.2 4 of the Government Code exonerated the city from liability. The court
pointed out that an act is ministerial if it consists only of
obedience to orders or the performance of a duty in which
the officer is left no choice of his own, and that an act is
discretionary if it requires personal deliberation, decision
and judgment. In citing Sava v. Fuller,5 the court reasoned
that classifying an act of a public employee as discretionary
does not produce immunity if the injury results not from
the employee's exercise of discretion vested in him to undertake the act, but from his negligence in performing the act
after having made the discretionary decision to do so. Since
the officer was negligent after the exercise of his discretion
to investigate the accident, he was not immune from liability
under section 820.2. Consequently, the city was not immune
under section 815.2(b).6
In Johnson v. State of California,7 plaintiff was assaulted
by a boy released from the California Youth Authority to
live in the plaintiff's foster home. The defendant knew that
the boy had homicidal tendencies and a background of violence but did not disclose these facts to the plaintiff. The
court held that the decision to parole the particular youth
and the selection of a foster home are matters falling within
the discretionary immunity section of the Government Code.
It follows, the court stated, that the decision not to inform
a prospective foster parent of certain tendencies of the ward
must also be sheltered by immunity. The court reasoned that
if homicidal tendencies must be disclosed, it might be impossible to draw the line between violent tendencies and others
that might be of interest to prospective parents. The court
4. § 820.2 When employee not liable: Exercise of discretion.
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for
an injury resulting from his act or
omission where the act or omission was
the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such
discretion be abused.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

5. 249 Cal. App.2d 281, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 312 (1967).
6. See also Widdows v. Koch, 263
Cal. App.2d 228, 69 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1968), for a further discussion of discretionary and ministerial acts.
7. 258 Cal. App.2d 65, 65 Cal. Rptr.
717 (1968) hearing granted 258 A.C.A.
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also pointed out that every decision to parole and place a
parolee in a home could possibly result in a law suit if the
court should hold to the contrary.
Liability for Acts of Independent Contractors

In Van Arsdale v. Hollinger,S an independent contractor
violated his contract with the city by failing to construct
barricades and warning devices on a street reconstruction
project. The primary issue was the city's liability to a person
injured as a result of this failure. The court found the answer
in the tort liability provisions of section 815.4 of the Government Code,9 in spite of the city's contractual delegation of
responsibility. The court ruled that the undisputed facts
showed that a risk of physical harm was likely without the
safety precautions and concluded that this likelihood imposed
on the city a nondelegable duty of care.
Eminent Domain
Inverse Condemnation

In Sutfin v. State of California, 10.11 the court was faced
with the question of whether damage to personal property
was compensable on the theory of inverse condemnation
where flooding had occurred from waters controlled by a flood
control district and caused damage to automobiles owned by
plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that the damage to his
personal property was compensable under Article I, Section
14 of the State Constitution, which provides, in part, ".
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation having first been made to, or
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353. See 69 Cal.2d - , 73 Cal. Rptr.
240,447 P.2d 352 (69 A.c. 813) (1968).
8. 68 CaI.2d 245, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20,
437 P.2d 508 (1968).
9. § 815.4 Same: Tortious act or
omission of independent contractor:
Limitation.
A public entity is liable for injury
proximately caused by a tortious act or
omission of an independent contractor
of the public entity to the same extent
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that the public entity would be subject
to such liability if it were a private
person. Nothing in this section subjects
a public entity to liability for the act
or omission of an independent contractor if the public entity would not
have been liable for the injury had the
act or omission been that of an employee of the public entity.

10,11. 261 Cal. App.2d 50, 67, Cal.
Rptr. 665 (1968).
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paid into court for the owner . . .". The plaintiff argued
that the phrase "public use" referred not to the property
taken or damaged, but to the public project that caused the
damage. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the
trial court and allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint to
determine if a cause of action in inverse condemnation could
be stated. The court noted that in proper cases, there may
be recovery for the taking or damaging of private property
for public use whether the property is real or personal, stating
that it was immaterial whether the property had been devoted
to a public use. The distinction appears to be that in order
to collect damages under inverse condemnation, it is necessary
to show that the damage resulted from an inherent danger in
the public operation (i.e., flooding, in this case) rather than
as a result of negligence in the operation of a public project.
In Colberg, Inc. v. State of California Ex Rei. Department
of Public Works/ 2 the state proposed to build twin low-level
freeway bridges across the mouth of an inlet that provided
access between the Stockton Deep Water Channel and plaintiff's shipyards in the Upper Stockton Channel. The vertical
clearance of these bridges would be approximately 45 feet
above the water line. The plaintiff alleged that about 81
percent of its business involved ships standing more than 45
feet above the water line, and that the present minimum clearance between his shipyards and the Pacific Ocean is 135 feet,
established by the Antioch Bridge.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that
the impairment of access to the plaintiff's shipyards was not
a "taking" or "damaging" of plaintiff's private property for
which compensation was required within the meaning of Article I, Section 14 of the California Constitution. The court
pointed out that the state, as owner of its navigable waterways,
may act relative to those waterways in any manner consistent
with the improvement of commerce and navigation. If the
property of a private owner is consequently injured, the prop12. 67 Cal.2d 408, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401,
432 P.2d 3 (1967), cert. den. 390 U.S.
949, 19 L.Ed.2d 1139, 88 S.C!. 1037.
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erty owner must, for the sake of the general welfare, yield with
uncompensated obedience.
Justice Peters, joined by Justice Mosk, dissented with the
contention that plaintiff's rights were substantially, not just
technically, impaired and that the impairment was caused
by the state not strictly to aid navigation but to improve a
freeway and subsequent auto travel. It was pointed out in
the dissent that had the freeway construction impaired land
access to the same degree, such impairment would be compensable. The dissent reasoned that where the use by the
state is not strictly for navigational purposes but, as here, for
freeway purposes, the policies of compensation declared in
the land access cases should apply.
Disputed Ownership

In an unusual situation where condemnor and condemnee
both claimed title to land sought to be condemned, the court
in People Ex Rei. Department of Public Works v. Shasta Pipe
& Supply Company,13 held that the rule set forth in City of
Los Angeles v. Pomeroy14 requires the condemnor to prove
what its interest is in the property it seeks to condemn. The
court found that the plaintiff had failed to set forth the
nature and extent of its claim of ownership and that, assuming
the defendants had satisfied this initial requirement by showing
their color of title, payment of taxes, etc., the burden of going
forward then shifted to the plaintiff and made it necessary for
him to show the nature of his title. A new trial was ordered
because the condemnor had failed to produce satisfactory
evidence of title and the trial court had merely assumed that
the condemnor owned the property in dispute.
Compensation

In City of Los Angeles v. Allen's Grocery Company, Inc.,15
13. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
618 (1968).
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14. 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1899),
err. dismd. 188 U.S. 314, 47 L.Ed.
487, 23 S.C!. 395.
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the court affirmed the well established rule that the condemnor
need only pay compensation for the property taken and not
for every loss the condemnee may suffer as a result of the
taking. The city sought to condemn property which the
defendant had leased and was using as a grocery store. After
some negotiations, the defendant gave the keys of the premises
to the city but refused to move any removable items from the
store. Defendant claimed damages for personal property on
the ground that the city, by taking the real property and the
attached fixtures, had forced him out of business and had
consequently condemned the entire business. The court held
that the city had condemned only the real property and that
the loss of real property did not compel compensation for the
stock in trade.
In City of Whittier v. Aramian/6 the court was faced with
the question of whether a dismissal of a condemnation suit
by the condemnor was equivalent to an abandonment under
section 1255a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which entitles
defendants to their costs and attorneys' fees if an action in
eminent domain is abandoned. Although the city was justified
in this case, because of lack of funds, in dismissing the condemnation action, the court held that the dismissal constituted
a voluntary abandonment even though the city expected to
proceed with condemnation action at a future date.
Does the taking of property for an economic purpose violate
Article I, Section 14 of the California Constitution on the
basis that such a taking would not be for a "public use"? In
People Ex ReI. Department of Public Works v. Superior
Court,17 the Department of Public Works required .65 acres
of land for the construction of a freeway and brought an
action in mandamus to compel the Superior Court to proceed
with the condemnation of the parcel in question. This small
portion was so located that 54 acres would be landlocked
by the taking. The department argued that it should be
allowed to condemn the entire parcel so the landowner would
receive full value for the property and the risk of excessive sev16. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
805 (1968),
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17. 68 Ca1.2d 206, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342,
436 P .2d 342 (1968).
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erance damages would be avoided. Although the department
conceded that the 54 acres were not necessary for the construction of the freeway, it argued that this acreage could be
sold to reduce the total cost of the freeway project. In a
split decision, the court held that section 104.1 of the Streets
and Highways Code 18 authorized the condemnation of the 54
acre parcel. But it qualified the holding by stating that if
the trial court should find the taking not justified to avoid
excessive severance or consequential damages, then the taking
would not be proper under the cited authority.
In dissenting, Justice Mosk, with whom Justice Peters
concurred, stated, "Whenever an illustration of the voracious
appetite of acquisitive government is desired, the action of
the public agency here will serve as exhibit 'A'."
18. § 104.1 Same: Taking whole
parcel and sale or exchange of unneeded
remnant.
Wherever a part of a parcel of land
is to be taken for state highway purposes and the remainder is to be left in
such shape or condition as to be of little

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/9

190

CAL LAW 1969

value to its owner, or to give rise to
claims or litigation concerning severance
or other damage, the department may
acquire the whole parcel and may sell
the remainder or may exchange the
same for other property needed for
state highway purposes.
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